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This is a brief discussion about communication and the life cycle of parliamentary politics. Coalition bargaining consists in a cyclical set of events, the sequence of which is sometimes given and sometimes negotiable. These phases are cabinet formation, governance, and termination. These articles also help us better understand the bargaining that precedes and accompanies any coalition, the process of policy making and governance, and the calculi that lie behind decisions concerning parliamentary termination. Communication matters in all of these contexts for at least two reasons. One of that, coalition politics is often complicated by mutual fear and distrust that can render politicians unable to cooperate, and there is therefore a deep need for ways in which politicians can commit themselves to cooperative and mutually beneficial behavior. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Three motivations for political delegation are described, & the agency dilemmas that may emerge as well as the imperative for mechanisms of accountability are considered. A delegation model is put forth that demonstrates that agency loss. In the manifestation of policy slippage, is greater than under either of two modes of presidentialism. Next, two other causes of democratic agency difficulties -- non-policy motivations (such as leisure-shirking & rent-seeking) & incomplete information -- are examined. Several institutional responses to the risks of delegation are considered; it is also shown that parliamentary democracy emphasizes adverse selection & fosters accountability mainly through ex ante screening by organized political parties. But it is also demonstrated that parliamentary democracy remains vulnerable to moral hazard. Overall, its distinctive attributes make parliamentary democracy efficient but frequently insufficiently transparent. 3 Tables, 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 89 References. K. Coddon

Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians & especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy & suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal & (or ideal-typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation & accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, & relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency & the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability & a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies, & whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices & diverted accountabilities. 1 Figure, 52 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper begins by identifying a framework in which we can study democratic representation and accountability, namely the neo-institutional rational choice literature on delegation and agency. I suggest why I believe that the enforcement of accountability is becoming a more and more central democratic issue. I then go on to share some data from Norwegian election surveys that indicate that voters, at least in this country, are increasingly available to play the part that democratic accountability requires. Finally, I present evidence that political leaders in coalition bargaining anticipate and are constrained by this electoral accountability, sometimes with surprising results. There is even a silver lining to this part of my story, in the sense that coalition outcomes that may at first sight seem deviant or even pathological, may in fact play a perfectly normal part in the democratic process.

Untersuchung der Wahlverfahren norwegischer Parteien bei der Nominierung von Kandidaten und der innerparteilichen Wahl eines Parteivorsitzenden sowie Analyse der Funktionen und der Bedeutung der Parteivorsitzenden innerhalb der jeweiligen Partei, des Regierungssystems bzw. des politischen Systems Norwegens